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Market Sentiment, IPO Underpricing, and Valuation 
Abstract 
We examine IPO underpricing, valuation, and wealth allocation in relation to 
investor sentiment, information asymmetry, and underwriter reputation. We find that 
underpricing is significantly higher for overvalued IPOs than for undervalued IPOs, 
and is positively correlated to investor sentiment. Information asymmetry is also 
positively correlated to the magnitude of underpricing but only for undervalued IPOs. 
We find no evidence of systematic over or undervaluation of IPOs based on peer firm 
accounting ratios. Change in market sentiment and information asymmetry is 
positively correlated to overvalued IPOs but not for undervalued. Better underwriter 
reputation leads to higher IPO valuation for all IPOs. Further, roughly 70% of the 
wealth from overvaluing IPOs is retained by the issuers.  For overvalued IPOs with 
positive first day returns, we find the proportion of total overvaluation that occurs in 
the after market trading, i.e., wealth allocated to IPO subscribers, is negatively 
correlated to underwriter reputation. We conclude underwriters selectively overvalue 
some IPOs after observing investor sentiment and take advantage of their information 
to maximize the benefit for issuers and indirectly themselves.  
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1. Introduction 
The dominance of positive first day returns for IPOs has puzzled finance 
academics for decades. A large body of finance literature have proposed various models 
and hypotheses to explain this so called “underpricing puzzle.” However, empirical 
studies have documented mixed results for most of the models and hypotheses. This 
study examines how investor sentiment, information asymmetry, and underwriter quality 
affect IPO underpricing, valuation, and wealth allocation in the context of the offer price 
relative to the firm’s intrinsic value. This paper contributes to the IPO literature in several 
important ways.  
First, we directly test how investor sentiment affects the magnitude of 
underpricing by adopting a sentiment index developed in Baker and Wurgler (2006, 
2007). Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) test the “fads” hypothesis and conclude that IPOs are 
subject to overvaluation or fads in early aftermarket trading, but they do not use a 
measure of sentiment. Using close-end discount as a measure of investor sentiment, Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) and Lowry (2003) find that “hot issue” periods coincide with 
low discounts on closed-end funds. However, they do not test whether investor sentiment 
leads to a higher first day return. 
Second, we examine the role of information asymmetry and underwriter 
reputation in IPO valuation and underpricing. Previous literature examines how 
information asymmetry and underwriter reputation affect the magnitude of underpricing 
but no study has investigated whether and how these two factors affect IPO valuation. 
Third, Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that investor sentiment is a more 
significant factor in the determination of valuation when information asymmetry is higher. 
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We provide the empirical evidence of how sentiment interacts with information 
asymmetry. 
Fourth, we provide empirical evidence on whether underwriters expropriate 
sentiment investors to better serve their clientele, the issuer, consistent with maximizing 
their own benefit.  
We find that the level and change in investor sentiment prior to the offering are 
significantly positively correlated to the magnitude of underpricing. The explanatory 
power of the level of sentiment is even higher when information asymmetry is higher, 
which lends strong support to the conjecture by Baker and Wurgler (2006). Inconsistent 
with the information asymmetry based models on underpricing, we find that information 
asymmetry is not in general correlated to the magnitude of underpricing. However, it is 
significantly positively correlated to the first day returns for undervalued IPOs.  
Regarding the valuation of IPOs at offer prices, we find that underwriters do not 
systematically under or overvalue IPOs relative to intrinsic value based on peer non-IPO 
firms. For our sample of over 2,100 IPOs from 1970 to 2004, about 50% are over-valued. 
Change in sentiment and information asymmetry is positively correlated to IPO valuation, 
but only for IPOs that are overvalued. However, better underwriter reputation leads to 
higher IPO valuation for all samples.  
We also find the issuer retains approximately 70% of the wealth from 
overvaluation. Using a sub-sample of IPOs that are overvalued with positive first day 
returns, we examine the wealth allocation of the total overvaluation. We find that the 
proportion of total overvaluation that occurs in the after market trading, wealth allocated 
to IPO subscribers, is negatively correlated to underwriter reputation.  
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Our findings suggest underwriters do expropriate sentiment investors to better 
serve their institutional clientele, the issuer, and to maximize their own benefit. 
Underwriters overvalue IPOs more when observing positive momentum in investor 
sentiment by setting the IPO offer prices closer to the maximum acceptable market prices 
in the presence of sentiment investors. Such a strategy would maximize their clientele’s 
interests as well as their own.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related 
literature. Described in Section 3 are data, selection criterion, and methodology. We 
present major empirical findings in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review    
This paper is related to the literature of measuring investor sentiment and how 
such sentiment affects the cross section of stock returns. Traditionally, a few variables, 
such as close-end fund discount, have been used to capture investor sentiment. A positive 
correlation between the level of sentiment and cross section of stock returns has been 
documented; however, the quality of those sentiment measures has been questioned from 
time to time. It is argued that those variables may indeed reflect investor sentiment by 
some degree but the correlation between these variables and stock return maybe 
reflecting relationships between returns and some macroeconomic factor that is captured 
by the sentiment proxy variable. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) construct a sentiment 
index based on six proxies for market sentiment orthoganized against a set of 
macroeconomic variables. They find that the sentiment index is significantly positively 
correlated to stock returns. In this paper, we used the sentiment index from Baker and 
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Wurgler (2006, 2007) to examine whether the IPO first day return and underwriter’s IPO 
valuation are positively correlated to investor sentiment. 
This paper is also highly related to the large body of finance literature on IPO 
underpricing, especially those IPO papers relating underpricing to investor sentiment, 
information asymmetry, and underwriter reputation.  
Investor sentiment has long been suspected of playing a role in the IPO 
underpricing puzzle. We provide this evidence. Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) argue that 
IPOs are subject to overvaluation or fads in early aftermarket trading. Derrien (2005) 
show that large individual investors’ demand, as a proxy for investor sentiment, leads to 
high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long-run performance. Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler (1991) and Lowry (2003) find that “hot issue” periods coincide with low discounts 
on closed-end funds. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) model an IPO company's 
optimal response to the presence of sentiment investors and short sale constraints. They 
conclude that IPOs are to be underpriced even in the absence of asymmetric information. 
However, the offer price still exceeds fundamental value. Rajan and Servaes (1997) find 
more firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth 
prospects of recent IPOs, but the degree of underpricing correlated to optimism is not 
directly tested. The lack of hard evidence of investor sentiment driving up IPO’s first day 
return is at least partially due to the lack of a high quality reliable sentiment measure. In 
this paper, we provide a direct test on the relationship between investor sentiment and 
magnitude of IPO first day returns using the sentiment index constructed by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006, 2007). 
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Information asymmetry has been considered in various models to effect 
underpricing. The information asymmetry based models can be classified into two 
general categories. The first category considers underpricing as the necessary discount to 
attract uninformed investors to mitigate the winner’s curse problem. Rock (1986) argues 
that when some investors have more information than others, underpricing is necessary to 
attract uninformed investors. Otherwise, uninformed investors face the “winner’s curse” 
and will not participate in IPOs, which could lead to the failure of over- or even fair-
priced IPOs. The second category of information asymmetry based models regards 
underpricing as compensation to informed investors for revealing their information on the 
value of the IPO firm to the underwriter. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that the 
book-building process enables underwriters to obtain costly information from informed 
investors and underpricing is a way to compensate investors for information they reveal. 
In this paper, we not only re-examine how information asymmetry affects underpricing 
since the empirical evidence has been mixed, but also investigate the role of information 
asymmetry from two new aspects that have not been examined before. The first is how 
information asymmetry affects underwriter’s IPO valuation at the offer price, and the 
second is how information asymmetry interacts with market sentiment. Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) argue that investor sentiment will play a more significant role in the 
valuation of stocks when information asymmetry is high. We provide a direct test on their 
conjecture in this paper. 
One of the most consistent empirical findings regarding IPO underpricing is the 
negative correlation between underwriter reputation and magnitude of underpricing 
[Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Loughran and Ritter 
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(2002)]. We find similar findings but in this paper, we also examine whether underwriter 
reputation is related to IPO valuation relative to the intrinsic value and the allocation of 
wealth in an IPO between the issuing firm and subscribers. 
Another line of research related to this paper is the valuation of IPOs. 
Traditionally, most of the IPO literature either explicitly or implicitly assumes the market 
is efficient and investors are rational such that the after market trading price reflects the 
intrinsic value of an IPO share. The investor sentiment argument challenges such an 
assumption. Consistent with the sentiment argument, Purnanadam and Swaminathan 
(2004) provide empirical evidence that IPOs are overvalued at the offer prices. They 
compare IPO offer prices to the intrinsic value of IPO firms and find that IPO offer prices 
are 14% to 50% above values based on industry peer price multiples. Pukthuanthong and 
Varaiya (2005) also find IPOs are overvalued on average. However, Zheng (2006) argues 
there are problems with the Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004) valuation methods and 
after the problems are corrected, IPOs are not overvalued on average.1  
3. Methodology, data, and sample selection 
3.1. Methodology 
Following Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004), we use matching firm’s three 
price multiples, price-to-sales, price-to-EBITDA, and price-to-earnings ratios, to estimate 
intrinsic values for each IPO firm. The intrinsic values for IPO firms using the three price 
multiples are computed as follows:  
 
1IPOs are still overvalued based on Zheng's adjusted price ratios. The magnitude of overvaluation is smaller 
than in Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004), but still statistically significant at the median. Zheng (2007) 
shows that after controlling for growth rate, the overvaluation of IPOs disappeared. However, as 
Purnanadam and Swaminathan (2004) point out the growth rates for IPOs are overly optimistic and ex post, 
the projected high growth of overvalued IPOs fails to materialize.  
IPO
match
match Sales
Sales
Price ×=SalesIPOV        (1) 
IPO
match
matchEBITDA
IPO EBITDAEBITDA
PriceV ×=      (2) 
IPO
match
matchEarnings
IPO EarningsEarnings
PriceV ×= .     (3)
 Based on the computed intrinsic value and the offer price, we separate the sample 
into two subsets: overpriced and underpriced.  
 For overpriced IPOs with positive underpricing, the total overvaluation is given 
by the difference between the first day trading price, P , and the intrinsic value, VFP IPO. 
For this group of IPO firms, the total amount of overvaluation is shared by two parties 
involved in the offering. The first party is the investors that are allocated IPO shares. 
They enjoy the difference between P  and PFP IPO, which is referred to as the “money left 
on the table.” The second party is the issuers, who enjoy the difference between VIPO and 
PIPO. We calculate the percentage of total overvaluation left to IPO subscribers for the 
case of overpriced IPOs with positive underpricing as follows: 
IPOFC
IPOFC
VP
PP
MLT −
−= .        (4)   
where P  is the first day closing price, P  is the offer price, and VFC IPO IPO is the intrinsic 
value based on accounting ratios. 
 The variables used in the empirical tests can be classified into three groups. First 
are the variables used by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004). The second are control 
variables found to be relevant in previous studies and third are the variables used to test 
the hypotheses in this study. 
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 The first category contains variables used in Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004). These include 1) the log of the value of the IPO to its intrinsic value, 2) log of the 
equity book to market value, 3) accruals of the firm at the time of issuance, 4) log of the 
firm’s sales, and 5) EBITDA divided by sales. The second category includes variables 
that have been shown in the literature to be relevant to the underpricing of IPOs. These 
include 1) a dummy variable for whether the firm was backed by venture capital (1=yes), 
2) a Greenshoe option dummy (1=yes), 3) a high technology dummy2 (1=yes), 4) log of 
the IPO dollar value, 5) a lockup dummy (1=yes), 6) if the firm is younger than five years 
(1=yes) and, 7) the underwriter ranking. The third category has a dummy variable (1=yes) 
if earnings are positive for the IPO.  
The information asymmetry index is the first principal component of four 
information asymmetry proxy variables. The four proxy variables are the lockup dummy 
(1=yes), fixed assets to total assets ratio, the percentage of secondary shares in the 
offering, and the young firm dummy (1=if the firm is in existence less than or equal to 
five years).  
To capture the level and change in investor sentiment, we use the orthogonalized 
sentiment index constructed by Baker and Wurgler (2006). This index is based on six 
proxies for market sentiment: 1) NYSE trading volume turnover, 2) the dividend 
premium, 3) the closed end fund discount, 4) the number of IPOs, 5) the first-day returns 
on IPOs, and 6) the equity share in new issues. As they report, since many of these 
variables are correlated both the level and changes index are the principal components of 
the levels and changes, respectively. One important point to make is that the sentiment 
                                                 
2 An IPO firm is classified as a high-tech company if the description in the “HIGHTECH” data item in SDC 
IPO database contains the word “computer,” “communication,” or “biotechnology.” 
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index we use does not incorporate contemporaneous IPO underpricing, only lagged IPO 
underpricing. We use both the three month cumulative orthogonalized change in the 
index and the three month average index prior to the IPO. 
3.2. Data and sample selection 
We start with all IPO issues between 1970 and 2004 in the Thomson’s Security 
Data Corporation IPO database and obtain information on the characteristics of the 
offerings found relevant in the literature. Unit offerings, close-end funds, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, American Depository Receipts, and financial firms are excluded. We 
also exclude IPOs without data in the Center for Research in Security Prices and 
COMPUSTAT, IPOs with an offer price under $5, and IPOs with non-positive earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in the prior fiscal year. 
Each IPO firm is matched with a firm in the same industry based on sales and EBITDA to 
sales margin, similar to the matching procedure in Purnanadam and Swaminathan 
(2004).3  
The monthly sentiment index and change in sentiment index are obtained from 
Wurgler’s web site and described in Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007). Underwriter 
rankings are obtained from Jay Ritter’s web page. If no appropriate matching firm is 
found or if the underwriter of an IPO does not have a ranking score, the IPO is excluded. 
Our final sample consists of 2,140 IPOs. 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 1 reports sample summary statistics based on the three different price 
multiple intrinsic values; offer price to sales, EBITDA and earnings. Several of the 
 
3 The matching by industry is based on 48 industry groups constructed by Fama and French (1997) using 
Standard Industry Codes (SIC).  
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statistics are similar to other IPO studies. For the whole sample the mean offer price and 
first day return is $13.05 and 12%, respectively. The average offering size is around $70 
million and roughly 20% of the shares offered are secondary shares. The mean sales and 
EBITDA/sales for the sample are $300 million and 15%, respectively. Using the earnings 
multiple results in slightly different numbers due to the sample size being decreasing 
because positive earnings are required. In the overall sample, high technology firms 
represent 33.03% of the offerings, 28.79% received venture capitalist financing, 63.69% 
had Greenshoe options and 58.27% have lockup agreements. 
Using the price to sales ratio 54.3% of IPOs are overvalued relative to the intrinsic 
value. These firms are valued on average 82.21% above the intrinsic value and the 
undervalued firms are offered at 40.55% below the intrinsic value. There are several 
significant differences between the two sub-samples. Overvalued offerings have higher 
initial day returns, a higher offer price, greater asymmetric information, and higher 
quality underwriters. More are backed by venture capitalists and use lockup agreements. 
Consistent with greater asymmetric information the firms are smaller, with sales half of 
the undervalued firms, lower returns on sales and are younger. The offering size is 
significantly smaller and the percentage of secondary offerings is less. Consistent with 
these variables that have been linked in the literature with asymmetric information, our 
information asymmetry index is significantly higher for overvalued firms. Further, the 
underwriter ranking is significantly higher for undervalued firms which may suggest 
ranking is more important when the market is less receptive to offerings. 
[Insert Table 1] 
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Examining the EBITDA multiple, similar observations can be drawn. Due to the 
restriction of requiring positive earnings, the sample size declines to 1,729 and some of 
the variables between under and overvalued offerings are no longer significant. 
Overvaluation is not as predominant as positive first day return. For our sample of 2,140 
IPOs, all IPOs, except 220 of them, have positive first day returns, whereas, the number 
of IPOs are almost evenly split between over and undervalued firms. This suggests that 
underwriters do not systematically overvalue IPOs. 
 
4.1. Underpricing for IPOs in the presence of asymmetric information and 
sentiment investors 
We turn first to the underpricing of IPOs. To examine this phenomenon, we use 
the following regression model: 
FDR = a + b1*LnPVratio + b2*LnBM + b3*Accrual + b4*LnSale  
+ b5*EBITMrgn + b6*Venture + b7*GShoe + b8*HiTech  
+ b9*LnSize + b10*PSTEarnings + b11*UWRank + b12*IA  
+ b13*AvgSent + b14*CumΔSent + b15*(AvgSent*IA)  
+ b16*(CumΔSent*IA) + ε     (5) 
 
 where FDR is the natural log of the first day closing price to the offer price. Table 2 
presents the results. For the entire sample, the five variables; log of the offer price relative 
to the intrinsic value, log of the book-to-market ratio, accruals, log of sales and EBITDA 
to sales margin, are a set of control variables used by Purnanandam and Swaminathan 
(2004). The coefficients have the same signs and significance levels as they report. The 
control variables of venture capital, Greenshoe, high tech, and IPO size also have the 
correct sign and are consistent with the literature. The dummy for positive earnings at the 
time of the IPO is significant and positive. Underwriter rank is significantly negative in 
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all but one of the regressions, which indicates lower underpricing by better underwriters, 
consistent with the literature. 
[Insert Table 2 here.] 
  The information asymmetry index is not significant for any of the all-sample 
regressions. The insignificance does not support the winner’s curse hypothesis and the 
compensation for information hypothesis. Both hypotheses imply that a higher 
information asymmetry leads to a higher first day return and our results do not support 
these hypotheses. However, the asymmetric information index does have explanatory 
power consistent with these hypotheses for undervalued IPOs only.  
 With respect to the variables related to market sentiment, the average sentiment is 
significant in all-sample regressions and regressions restricted to undervalued IPOs, while 
the cumulative change in investor sentiment is significantly positive in all regressions. 
This is compelling evidence that underpricing is significantly impacted by investor 
sentiment. Moreover the momentum in investor sentiment and the average investor 
sentiment interaction with information asymmetry are significantly positive, suggesting 
greater effects from level of sentiment on the first day return when information 
asymmetry is higher. This finding supports the conjecture by Baker and Wurgler (2006).  
 Dividing the sample into over and undervalued IPOs some determinants of the 
first day return are similar but others are decidedly different. The variables that are 
significantly positive and in common are the Greenshoe option, high technology dummy, 
size, cumulative change in sentiment and the interaction term between asymmetric 
information and average sentiment. For the undervalued IPOs the positive earnings, 
information asymmetry index, and average market sentiment coefficients are significant 
 13
and positive while they are not for overvalued IPOs. For overvalued IPOs the log of the 
sales and the profitability margin are significant and negative. The underwriter ranking is 
significant for undervalued IPOs, but not for overvalued IPOs. Moreover, the adjusted R2 
is lower for regressions restricted to undervalued IPOs than for other regressions. We 
conclude that the drivers behind first day IPO returns are not the same for under and 
overvalued IPOs. Moreover, this is consistent with traders in the market after the offering 
driving the price up, resulting in larger initial returns or underpricing.  
 
4.2 Underwriter  IPO valuation 
 We examine whether variables known to affect IPO first day returns also affect 
underwriter IPO valuation at the offer price using the following regression: 
 
 LnPVratio = a + b1*Accrual + b2*LnSale + b3*EBITMrgn + b4*Venture  
+ b5*GShoe +  b6*HiTech  + b7*PSTEarnings + b8*UWRank  
+ b9*IA + b10*AvgSent + b11*CumΔSent + b12*(AvgSent*IA)  
+ b13*(CumΔSent*IA) + b14*(UWRank*IA) +  ε.   (6) 
 
where LnPVratio is the natural log of the IPO offer price to intrinsic value ratio. The 
results are presented in Table 3. For the full sample underwriters value IPOs lower 
relative to intrinsic value for larger IPOs (lnsale), high tech firms, firms with higher 
accruals, and firms with lower EBITDA margins. The venture dummy is positive and 
significant only when earnings are used to compute intrinsic value and for the all-sample 
and overvalued firm samples. The Greenshoe dummy is not significant in any regression. 
Restrict the regressions to either under or overvalued IPOs, the signs for these control 
variables are generally consistent with the full sample regressions. However, more  
coefficients are significant in overvalued regressions than undervalued regressions.  
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[Insert Table 3 here.] 
Underwriter rank is significantly positive in most of the regressions, suggesting 
more reputable underwriters price IPOs higher. The information asymmetry index and the 
cumulative change in sentiment are significant and positive in all of the over-valued IPO 
regressions. These findings are consistent with the notion that underwriters take 
advantage of investor sentiment by pricing IPOs at higher prices when there is an 
improvement in investor sentiment in order to maximize benefit for issuers and for 
themselves. Supporting this interpretation, the interaction term between the underwriter 
rank and the information asymmetry index is significant and negative in the full samples, 
but this appears to be driven by the overvalued firms since the coefficients are significant 
for overvalued, but not undervalued, IPOs. The interaction term between information 
asymmetry and underwriter rank is significantly negative, suggesting that keeping 
everything else constant, the higher the information asymmetry the lower underwriters 
price the IPOs.  
 When dividing the sample into under and overvalued IPOs we again find that they 
differ in the explanatory variables relevant to underwriter IPO valuation at offer price 
relative to intrinsic value. Not only do many of the coefficients differ in signs and 
significance but also the adjusted R2 is much lower for undervalued IPOs. We conclude 
that just as the market prices undervalued IPOs differently than overvalued IPOs so do 
investment bankers. However, of significance is the apparent effort on behalf of their 
clients for investment bankers to price the offerings as high as possible given their 
information and skills. 
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4.3 Allocation of wealth 
When an IPO is over-valued with positive underpricing, the allocation of the over-
valuation between the IPO participants becomes an issue. We predict that money “left on 
the table,” or monies not received by IPO issuers due to underpricing, as a percentage of 
the total overvaluation should be lower when underwriter ranking is higher. Empirical 
evidence from early part of this paper suggests that underwriters act for the benefit of 
issuers and themselves. Therefore, we expect better underwriters to be able to better 
estimate the maximum acceptable offer price by the market and set offer prices closer to 
the maximum acceptable price by the market in the presence of sentiment investors, 
which implies that the proportion of over-valuation left on the table will be smaller. 
Market sentiment also affects this allocation of wealth. The stronger market sentiment the 
greater the underpricing resulting in more left on the table. 
Table 4 reports the per share dollar amount in panel A and percentage of intrinsic 
value allocation in panel B of wealth “left on the table.” IPO subscribers receive 
approximately 30% of the total overvaluation of the IPO, indicating about 70% is 
received by the firm. On a per share basis using sales or EBITDA multiples, reported in 
panel A, the first day closing price less the intrinsic value indicates  approximately $7 to 
$8 is the amount of overvaluation with about $5.25 going to the client and $2.60 accruing 
to subscribers. Panel B supports the hypothesis that investment banker mispricing is to 
the benefit of the clients. The total overvaluation is around 200% while for undervalued 
firms the under valuation is in the vicinity of 30%. 
[Insert Table 4.] 
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 Money left on the table is defined differently from the previous literature. 
Previously, it is simply the first day return in a dollar amount. Here we define it to be 
overvaluation by the market first day close less the offer price divided by the total 
overvaluation or first day close less the intrinsic value. This percentage is the percent of 
overvaluation left on the table. This definition necessarily limits the sample to IPOs with 
positive first day return and overvaluation. The following regression is run: 
 MLT = a + b1*LnPVratio + b2*LnBM + b3*Accrual + b4*LnSale + b5*EBITMrgn  
+ b6*HiTech + b7*Venture + b8*GShoe + b9*LnSize + b10*PSTEarnings + 
 b11*UWRank + b12*IA + b13*AvgSent + b14*CumΔSent + b15*(AvgSent*IA) 
 + b16*(CumΔSent*IA) + b17(UWRank*IA) + ε .    (7) 
 
The results are reported in Table 5. The significantly negative coefficient 
indicates the higher the underwriter rank the less money is left on the table consistent 
with greater overpricing relative to intrinsic firm value on behalf of their clients. The 
three-month cumulative change in investor sentiment is also positive and highly 
significant and leading to a higher apparent portion of money left on the table but investor 
sentiment results in greater underpricing and hence an appearance of more money left on 
the table. The evidence reinforces our conclusion that underwriters expropriate sentiment 
investors to better serve their institutional clientele, the issuer, and to maximize their own 
benefit. 
 [Insert Table 5 here.] 
5. Conclusions 
As IPOs are priced by investment bankers away from the intrinsic value, IPOs can 
be either overvalued or undervalued. Unlike the systematic underpricing puzzle, we find 
that IPOs are about evenly split between undervalued and overvalued.  
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We examine IPO valuation and underpricing in relation to investor sentiment, 
information asymmetry, and underwriter reputation. We find that underpricing is 
significantly higher for overvalued IPOs than for undervalued IPOs, and is positively 
correlated to investor sentiment. Information asymmetry is also positively correlated to 
the magnitude of underpricing but only for undervalued IPOs, which is not consistent 
with the information asymmetry based models regarding underpricing. Consistent with 
the literature, we do find smaller underpricing when underwriter reputation is higher. 
Examining the valuation of IPOs based on accounting ratios for peer non-IPO 
firms, we find there is no systematic over or undervaluation of IPOs, which is in contrast 
to the predominance of positive first day returns. For our sample of over 2,100 IPOs from 
1970 to 2004, about 90% have positive first day returns while about 50% are overvalued. 
Change in sentiment and information asymmetry is positively correlated to overvalued 
IPOs but not for undervalued. However, better underwriter reputation leads to higher IPO 
valuation for all IPOs. It is possible that underwriters selectively overvalue some of the 
IPOs after observing investor sentiment and take advantage of their information to 
maximize the benefit for issuers and indirectly themselves.    
In support of this, we find that roughly 70% of the wealth from overvalued IPOs 
is retained by the issuers. Moreover, for overvalued IPOs with positive first day returns, 
we find that the proportion of total overvaluation that occurs in the after market trading, 
wealth allocated to IPO subscribers, is negatively correlated to underwriter reputation, 
suggesting that issuers retain more wealth from the overvaluation of IPOs when more 
reputable underwriters are used.  
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 Table 1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the sample of 2,140 IPOs between 1970 and 2004 are reported. IPOs are grouped into two categories based on whether the IPO is over or undervalued 
relative to the intrinsic value determined by matching firm multiples. Intrinsic value is computed using price multiples as follows: 
 
IPO
match
matchSales
IPOV SalesSales
Price ×=       (1) 
IPO
match
matchEBITDA
IPOV EBITDAEBITDA
Price ×=     (2) 
IPO
match
matchEarnings
IPOV EarningsEarnings
Price ×=     (3) 
 
First day return is the natural log of the first day closing price to offer price. Monthly sentiment index is the sentiment index constructed in Baker and Wurgler (2006) and is 
obtained form Wurgler’s website. Information asymmetry index is the first principal component of four information asymmetry proxy variables: lockup dummy (1=yes), 
fixed assets to total assets ratio, the percentage of secondary shares in the offering, and the young firm dummy (1=if the firm is in existence less than or equal to five years). 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% two-tailed tests, respectively. 
 
Sales EBITDA Earnings 
Variable All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued 
Log of offer price / 
intrinsic value 
0.09 -0.52 0.60 
***
0.08 -0.62      0.68 
***
0.00 -0.77 0.81 
*** 
First day % return 0.12 0.10 0.13 
***
0.12 0.10      0.13 
***
0.12 0.10 0.13 
*** 
Offer price per share 13.05 12.66 13.38 
***
13.05 12.84 13.23 13.10 12.30 13.94 
*** 
Offering amount (M$) 71.91 89.00 57.52 
***
71.91 97.46 49.83 
***
68.61 71.05 66.06 
Secondary shares (M$) 20.07 22.35 18.15 
***
20.07 22.19 18.24 
***
21.37 21.99 20.73 
Fixed assets / total 
assets 
0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27       0.27 0.26 0.25 0.28 
** 
   -0.05 -0.11-0.08      0.09 
***
-0.17-0.030.08 
***
-0.16-0.03Information asymmetry 
index 
 Table 1 continued 
 
Sales EBITDA Earnings 
Variable All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued 
Average 3 month pre-
offer  sentiment 
0.25 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26        0.24 0.25 0.27 0.24 
Cumulative 3 month Δ 
in pre-offer sentiment 
0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.03        0.05 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Underwriter rank 7.32 7.46 7.20 
***
7.32 7.50        7.17 
***
7.32 7.09 7.56 
*** 
Log of book to market 
of equity 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
***
0.00 0.00        0.00 
***
0.00 0.00 0.00 
** 
Accruals at IPO 
issuance 
-0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
*
-0.03 -0.02       -0.03 -0.02 -0.02    -0.02 
Sales (M$) 305.04 414.53 212.88 
***
305.04 428.95    197.97 
***
275.81 304.68  245.75 
EBITDA / assets 0.15 0.16 0.14 
***
0.15 0.16        0.14 
***
0.16 0.17      0.16 
* 
High technology firm 707 305 402 
*
707 298 409 
***
561 268 293 
* 
Venture capitalist 
funded 
616 244 372 
***
616 262 354 
**
479 185 294 
*** 
Greenshoe option 1,363 614 749 1363 630 733 1105 559 546 
Lockup provision 1,247 542 705 
**
1247 532 715 
***
991 491 500 
Younger than five years 200 75 125 
**
200 79 121 
**
148 72 76 
N 2,140 978 1,162 2140 992 1148 1729 882 847 
 Table 2  
Investor Sentiment, Information Asymmetry, Underwriter Rank, and IPO First Day Return 
 
The table reports regression results for the following equation: 
 
FDR = a + b1*LnPVratio + b2*LnBM + b3*Accrual + b4*LnSale + b5*EBITMrgn + b6*Venture + b7*GShoe + b8*HiTech + b9*LnSize + b10*PSTEarnings 
+ b11*UWRank + b12*IA + b13*AvgSent + b14*CumΔSent + b15*(AvgSent*IA) + b16*(CumΔSent*IA) + ε      (5) 
 
where FDR is the IPO first day return, defined as nature log of first day closing price divided by offer price; LnPVratio is the nature log of offer price to intrinsic value ratio, 
where intrinsic value is computed using matching firms price to Sales ratio, price to EBITDA ratio, and price to Earnings ratio, respectively; LnBM is the nature log of book 
to market ratio for the fiscal year of IPO; Accrual is the total accruals for the fiscal year prior to IPO; LnSale is the nature log of sales for the fiscal year prior to IPO; 
EBITMrgn is the EBITDA margin defined as the EBITDA to total assets ratio; Venture is a dummy variable, euquals 1 for venture backed IPOs; GShoe is a dummy variable, 
equals 1 for IPOs with Greenshoe option; HiTech is a dummy variable, equals 1 for high technology companies; LnSize is the nature log of dollar offer amount; PSTEarnings 
is a dummy variable, equals 1 for IPOs with positive earning prior to IPO; UWRank is underwriter ranking score. Ranking score is obtained from Ritter’s website; IA is the 
information asymmetry index, which the first principle component of four information asymmetry proxy variables: lockup dummy (1=yes), fixed assets to total assets ratio, 
the percentage of secondary shares in the offering, and the young firm dummy (1=if the firm is in existence less than or equal to five years); AvgSent is the 3-month average 
investor sentiment index prior to the month of IPO; CumΔSent is the cumulative 3-month change in investor sentiment index prior to the month of IPO. Investor sentiment 
index and change in the index are obtained from Wurgler’s website; AvgSent*IA is the interaction term between 3-month average investor sentiment index and information 
asymmetry index; and CumΔSent*IA is the interaction term between 3-month cumulative change in investor sentiment index and information asymmetry index. Numbers in 
the parentheses are the p-values. 
 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Sales 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to EBITDA 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Earnings 
Ratio 
 
Variable 
All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued 
Intercept -0.3138 
(<.0001) 
-0.2524 
(<.0001)
-0.3587 
(<.0001)
-0.3181 
(<.0001)
-0.2175 
(<.0001)
-0.3848 
(<.0001)
-0.3063 
(<.0001)
-0.2841 
(<.0001)
-0.3162 
(<.0001) 
LnPVratio 0.0132 
(0.0048) 
0.0107 
(0.2701)
0.0124 
(0.1964)
0.0153 
(<.0001)
0.0163 
(0.0285)
0.0129 
(0.1329)
0.0041 
(0.1883)
-0.0019 
(0.7578)
0.0025 
(0.7010) 
LnBM -0.0336 
(<.0001) 
-0.0273 
(<.0001)
-0.0383 
(<.0001)
-0.0336 
(<.0001)
-0.0261 
(<.0001)
-0.0391 
(<.0001)
-0.0370 
(<.0001)
-0.0320 
(<.0001)
-0.0398 
(<.0001) 
Accrual -0.0046 
(0.6986) 
-0.0150 
(0.3668)
-0.0017 
(0.9171)
-0.0042 
(0.7250)
-0.0165 
(0.2743)
0.0052 
(0.7695)
-0.0039 
(0.7562)
-0.0151 
(0.3276)
0.0062 
(0.7533) 
LnSale -0.0099 
(0.0169) 
-0.0064 
(0.2473)
-0.0121 
(0.0480)
-0.0092 
(0.0245)
-0.0085 
(0.1098)
-0.0113 
(0.0679)
-0.0125 
(0.0053)
-0.0001 
(0.9827)
-0.0233 
(0.0005) 
EBITDA / sales -0.0683 
(0.0489) 
-0.0241 
(0.5985)
-0.0966 
(0.0581)
-0.0593 
(0.0868)
-0.0241 
(0.5770)
-0.0887 
(0.1019)
-0.0770 
(0.0374)
-0.0013 
(0.9779)
-0.1331 
(0.0174) 
 Table 2 continued 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Sales 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to EBITDA 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Earnings 
Ratio 
 
Variable 
All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued 
Venture 0.0123 
(0.0964) 
0.0114 
(0.2582)
0.0123 
(0.2425)
0.0128 
(0.0825)
0.0151 
(0.1136)
0.0113 
(0.3011)
0.0134 
(0.0951)
0.0027 
(0.8062)
0.0202 
(0.0774) 
GShoe 0.0870 
(<.0001) 
0.0672 
(<.0001)
0.1038 
(<.0001)
0.0868 
(<.0001)
0.0681 
(<.0001)
0.1008 
(<.0001)
0.0885 
(<.0001)
0.0934 
(<.0001)
0.0832 
(<.0001) 
HiTech 0.0246 
(0.0006) 
0.0325 
(0.0007)
0.0204 
(0.0509)
0.0250 
(0.0005)
0.0239 
(0.0108)
0.0248 
(0.0187)
0.0217 
(0.0049)
0.0244 
(0.0151)
0.0196 
(0.0930) 
LnSize 0.0331 
(<.0001) 
0.0295 
(<.0001)
0.0352 
(<.0001)
0.0328 
(<.0001)
0.0281 
(<.0001)
0.0392 
(<.0001)
0.0340 
(<.0001)
0.0191 
(0.0121)
0.0478 
(<.0001) 
PSTEarnings 0.0230 
(0.0362) 
0.0323 
(0.0282)
0.0173 
(0.2765)
0.0243 
(0.0262)
0.0233 
(0.1104)
0.0252 
(0.1133)
 
UWRank -0.0051 
(0.0137) 
-0.0072 
(0.0079)
-0.0045 
(0.1504)
-0.0052 
(0.0119)
-0.0067 
(0.0123)
-0.0053 
(0.0933)
-0.0058 
(0.0094)
-0.0054 
(0.0526)
-0.0068 
(0.0636) 
IA index 0.0036 
(0.2799) 
0.0094 
(0.0188)
-0.0039 
(0.4502)
0.0034 
(0.3049)
0.0085 
(0.0308)
-0.0040 
(0.4501)
0.0029 
(0.4025)
0.0149 
(0.0007)
-0.0106 
(0.0599) 
AvgSent 0.0120 
(0.0214) 
0.0230 
(0.0008)
0.0003 
(0.9725)
0.0121 
(0.0200)
0.0183 
(0.0059)
0.0052 
(0.5038)
0.0136 
(0.0159)
0.0160 
(0.0285)
0.0105 
(0.2205) 
CumΔSent 0.0204 
(<.0001) 
0.0181 
(<.0001)
0.0231 
(<.0001)
0.0204 
(<.0001)
0.0164 
(<.0001)
0.0236 
(<.0001)
0.0192 
(<.0001)
0.0118 
(0.0005)
0.0249 
(<.0001) 
AvgSent*IA 0.0121 
(0.0226) 
0.0119 
(0.0800)
0.0164 
(0.0426)
0.0115 
(0.0300)
0.0112 
(0.0971)
0.0160 
(0.0495)
0.0143 
(0.0133)
0.0139 
(0.0723)
0.0153 
(0.0803) 
CumΔSent*IA 0.0004 
(0.8550) 
0.0029 
(0.2719)
-0.0032 
(0.2956)
0.0003 
(0.8759)
0.0027 
(0.2746)
-0.0022 
(0.4914)
0.0005 
(0.8217)
0.0005 
(0.8646)
0.0015 
(0.6744) 
Adusted R2 0.2711 0.2340 0.2844 0.2737 0.2274 0.2921 0.2967 0.2589 0.3325 
N 2,140 978 1,162 2,140 992 1,148 1,729 882 847 
 Table 3  
Investor Sentiment, Information Asymmetry, Underwriter Rank, and Underwriter Valuation 
 
This table reports regression results for the following regression: 
 
LnPVratio = a + b1*Accrual + b2*LnSale + b3*EBITMrgn + b4*Venture + b5*GShoe + b6*HiTech + b7*PSTEarnings + b8*UWRank + b9*IA + b10*AvgSent  
+ b11*CumΔSent + b12*(AvgSent*IA) + b13*(CumΔSent*IA) + b14*(UWRank*IA) + ε       (6) 
 
where LnPVratio is the natural log of offer price to intrinsic value ratio, where intrinsic value is computed using matching firms price to Sales ratio, price to EBITDA ratio, 
and price to Earnings ratio, respectively; Accrual is the total accruals for the fiscal year prior to IPO; LnSale is the nature log of sales for the fiscal year prior to IPO; 
EBITMrgn is the EBITDA margin defined as the EBITDA to total assets ratio; Venture is a dummy variable, euquals 1 for venture backed IPOs; GShoe is a dummy variable, 
equals 1 for IPOs with Greenshoe option; HiTech is a dummy variable, equals 1 for high technology companies; PSTEarnings is a dummy variable, equals 1 for IPOs with 
positive earning prior to IPO; UWRank is underwriter ranking score. Ranking score is obtained from Ritter’s website; IA is the information asymmetry index, which the first 
principle component of four information asymmetry proxy variables: lockup dummy (1=yes), fixed assets to total assets ratio, the percentage of secondary shares in the 
offering, and the young firm dummy (1=if firm is in existence less than or equal to 5 years); AvgSent is the 3-month average investor sentiment index prior to the month of 
IPO; CumΔSent is the cumulative 3-month change in investor sentiment index prior to the month of IPO. Investor sentiment index and change in the index are obtained from 
Wurgler’s website; AvgSent*IA is the interaction term between 3-month average investor sentiment index and information asymmetry index; CumΔSent*IA is the interaction 
term between 3-month cumulative change in investor sentiment index and information asymmetry index; and UWRank*IA is the interaction term between underwriter 
ranking score and information asymmetry index. Numbers in the parentheses are the p-values. 
 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Sales 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to EBITDA 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Earnings 
Ratio 
 
Variable 
All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued 
Intercept 0.8034 
(<.0001) 
-0.3915 
(<.0001) 
1.1987 
(<.0001) 
0.9617 
(<.0001) 
-0.7305 
(<.0001) 
1.5040 
(<.0001) 
-0.3018 
(0.0134) 
-0.9034 
(<.0001) 
0.77403 
(<.0001) 
Accrual -0.1404 
(0.0126) 
-0.0622 
(0.2575) 
-0.0680 
(0.2001) 
-0.1510 
(0.0243) 
-0.0835 
(0.2017) 
-0.0507 
(0.4202) 
-0.1260 
(0.1951) 
-0.0683 
(0.4244) 
-0.14676 
(0.1707) 
LnSale -0.2091 
(<.0001) 
-0.0489 
(<.0001) 
-0.1667 (<.0001) -0.2210 
(<.0001) 
-0.0324 
(0.0228) 
-0.1861 
(<.0001) 
-0.0269 
(0.2216) 
0.0393 
(0.0486) 
0.00693 
(0.7685) 
EBITDA / sales -1.0693 
(<.0001) 
-0.3397 
(0.0108) 
-0.5873 
(<.0001) 
-1.4628 
(<.0001) 
-0.2916 
(0.0775) 
-1.3271 
(<.0001) 
-0.8310 
 (0.0014) 
-0.1756 
(0.4538) 
-0.42561 
(0.1280) 
Venture 0.0001 
(0.9969) 
0.0233 
(0.4837) 
-0.0651 
(0.0497) 
-0.0345 
(0.4063) 
-0.0019 
(0.9639) 
-0.0500 
(0.1940) 
0.2984 
(<.0001) 
0.0688 
(0.2585) 
0.11077 
(0.0746) 
GShoe 0.0290 
(0.3503) 
-0.0117 
(0.6776 ) 
0.0540 
(0.0792) 
0.0387 
 (0.2961) 
0.0436 
(0.2225) 
0.0532 
(0.1282) 
-0.0026 
(0.9615) 
-0.0216 
(0.6607) 
0.04441 
 (0.4496) 
HiTech -0.1086 
(0.0012) 
-0.0109 
(0.7280) 
-0.0931 
(0.0041) 
-0.1152 
(0.0040) 
-0.1087 
(0.0064) 
-0.0895 
(0.0148) 
-0.0165 
(0.7814) 
0.0403 
(0.4595) 
-0.04051 
(0.5169) 
 Table 3 continued 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Sales 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to EBITDA 
Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to Earnings 
Ratio 
 
Variable 
All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued All Undervalued Overvalued 
PSTEarnings -0.0593 
(0.2471) 
0.0370 
(0.4479) 
-0.0444 
(0.3657) 
-0.1480 
(0.0154) 
0.0997 
(0.1121) 
-0.1495 
(0.0068) 
      
UWRank 0.0478 
(<.0001) 
0.0149 
(0.0885) 
0.0207 
(0.0298) 
0.0514 
(<.0001) 
0.0278 
(0.0142) 
0.0248 
(0.0195) 
0.0650 
(0.0001) 
-0.0012 
(0.9332) 
0.00298 
(0.8789) 
IA-index 0.1917 
(0.001) 
0.0525 
(0.3400) 
0.1657 
(0.0031) 
0.1982 
(0.0042) 
0.0239 
(0.7457) 
0.2110 
(0.0006) 
0.1422 
(0.1640) 
-0.0472 
(0.5766) 
0.32447 
(0.0088) 
AvgSent -0.0068 
(0.7863) 
0.0055 
(0.8088) 
-0.0129 
(0.6021) 
-0.0124 
(0.6760) 
0.0154 
(0.5920) 
0.0355 
(0.2045) 
-0.0390 
(0.3765) 
-0.0186 
(0.6437) 
-0.05228 
(0.2634) 
CumΔSent 0.0189 
(0.0857) 
-0.0032 
(0.7462) 
0.0224 
(0.0430) 
0.0175 
(0.1808) 
0.0117 
(0.3472) 
0.0261 
(0.0373) 
0.0238 
(0.2261) 
-0.0065 
(0.7265) 
0.04127 
(0.0426) 
AvgSent*IA 0.0039 
(0.8763) 
-0.0378 
(0.0936) 
0.0060 
(0.8132) 
0.0444 
(0.1385) 
-0.0188 
(0.5153) 
0.0733 
(0.0108) 
0.0061 
(0.8925) 
-0.1092 
(0.0093) 
0.05705 
(0.2302) 
CumΔSent*IA -0.0056 
(0.5680) 
-0.0094 
(0.2912) 
-0.0011 
(0.9081) 
-0.0011 
(0.9226) 
0.0011 
(0.9162) 
-0.0006 
(0.9595) 
0.0122 
(0.4837) 
0.0096 
(0.5326) 
0.04889 
(0.0120) 
UWRank*IA -0.0186 
(0.0103) 
-0.0048 
(0.4825) 
-0.0186 
(0.0084) 
-0.0186 
(0.0308) 
-0.0020 
(0.8280) 
-0.0246 
(0.0018) 
-0.0084 
(0.5124) 
0.0102 
(0.3357) 
-0.03024 
(0.0477) 
Adj – R2 0.1613 0.0226 0.1824 0.1398 0.0065 0.2059 0.0330 0.0045 0.0387 
N 2140 978 1162 2140 992 1148 1729 882 847 
 
 Table 4  
Allocation of Wealth from IPO Overvalution and Positive First Day Return 
 
This table presents the allocation of wealth between issuers and IPO subscribers coming from IPO overvaluation and positive first day returns. Panel A 
reports the allocation in dollar amount per share and Panel B reports the allocation as percent of intrinsic value. Intrinsic value is computed using matching firms 
price to sales ratio, price to EBITDA ratio, and price to earnings ratio, respectively.    
 
Panel A: Per share dollar amount 
 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to 
Sales Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to 
EBITDA Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to 
Earnings Ratio 
 
Under- 
valued 
Over- 
valued All 
Under- 
valued 
Over- 
valued All 
Under- 
valued 
Over- 
valued All 
Total Overvaluation 
(First day closing – intrinsic value) 
-9.0606 7.7325 0.0579 -14.5527 8.0298 -2.4384 -25.2563 9.0392 -8.4556 
Allocation to Issuers 
(Offer price – intrinsic value) 
-10.6281 5.1391 -2.0666 -16.1544 5.4535 -4.5629 -26.8669 6.4049 -10.5677 
Allocation to Subscribers 
(First day closing – offer price) 
1.5675 2.5934 2.1245 1.6017 2.5763 2.1245 1.7906 2.6343 2.1245 
Percentage Allocation to Subscribers 
(Allocation to Subscribers / total overvaluation) 
- 33.54%  - 32.08% - - 29.14% - 
N 978 1162 2140 992 1148 2140 882 847 1729 
 
Panel B: As a percentage of intrinsic value 
 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to 
Sales Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to 
EBITDA Ratio 
Intrinsic Value Based on Price to 
Earnings Ratio 
 
Under- 
valued 
Over- 
valued All 
Under- 
valued 
Over- 
valued All 
Under- 
valued 
Over- 
valued All 
Total Overvaluation 
(First day closing – intrinsic value) 
-28.22% 178.72% 84.15% -32.89% 231.98% 109.20% -38.98% 576.85% 262.70% 
Allocation to Issuers 
(Offer price – intrinsic value) 
-35.68% 133.65% 56.27% -39.91% 172.37% 73.96% -45.38% 479.12% 211.56% 
Allocation to Subscribers 
(First day closing – offer price) 
7.47% 45.06% 27.88% 7.02% 59.61% 35.24% 6.39% 97.74% 51.14% 
Percentage Allocation to Subscribers 
(Allocation to retail investors / total overvaluation) 
- 25.21% - - 25.70% - - 16.94% - 
N 978 1162 2140 992 1148 2140 882 847 1729 
 
 Table 5  
Allocation of Wealth for Overvalued IPOs with Positive First Day Return 
 
This table reports regression results for the following regression. 
 
MLT = a + b1*LnPVratio + b2*LnBM + b3*Accrual + b4*LnSale + b5*EBITMrgn + b6*HiTech  
+ b7*Venture + b8*GShoe + b9*LnSize + b10*PSTEarnings + b11*UWRank + b12*IA  
+ b13*AvgSent + b14*CumΔSent + b15*(AvgSent*IA) + b16*(CumΔSent*IA)  
+ b17(UWRank*IA) + ε        (7) 
 
where MLT is money left on the table define as (First day closing price – offer price)/(First day closing 
price – intrinsic value), where intrinsic value is computed using matching firms price to Sales ratio, price to 
EBITDA ratio, and price to Earnings ratio, respectively; LnPVratio is the nature log of offer price to 
intrinsic value ratio; LnBM is the nature log of book to market ratio for the fiscal year of IPO; Accrual is 
the total accruals for the fiscal year prior to IPO; LnSale is the nature log of sales for the fiscal year prior to 
IPO; EBITMrgn is the EBITDA margin defined as the EBITDA to total assets ratio; HiTech is a dummy 
variable, equals 1 for high technology companies; Venture is a dummy variable, equals 1 for venture 
backed IPOs; GShoe is a dummy variable, equals 1 for IPOs with Greenshoe option; LnSize is the nature 
log of dollar offer amount; PSTEarnings is a dummy variable, equals 1 for IPOs with positive earning prior 
to IPO; UWRank is underwriter ranking score. Ranking score is obtained from Ritter’s website; IA is the 
information asymmetry index, which the first principle component of four information asymmetry proxy 
variables: lockup dummy (1=yes), fixed assets to total assets ratio, the percentage of secondary shares in 
the offering, and the young firm dummy (1=if the firm is in existence less than or equal to five years); 
AvgSent is the 3-month average investor sentiment index prior to the month of IPO; CumΔSent is the 
cumulative 3-month change in investor sentiment index prior to the month of IPO. Investor sentiment index 
and change in the index are obtained from Wurgler’s website; AvgSent*IA is the interaction term between 
3-month average investor sentiment index and information asymmetry index; CumΔSent*IA is the 
interaction term between 3-month cumulative change in investor sentiment index and information 
asymmetry index; and UWRank*IA is the interaction term between underwriter ranking score and 
information asymmetry index. Numbers in the parentheses are the p-values. 
 
Variable Intrinsic Value 
Based on Price to 
Sales Ratio 
Intrinsic Value 
Based on Price to 
EBITDA Ratio 
Intrinsic Value 
Based on Price to 
Earnings Ratio 
Intercept -0.1043 
(0.1566) 
-0.0651 
(0.3670) 
-0.0345 
(0.6609) 
LnPVratio -0.1629 
(<.0001) 
-0.1456 
(<.0001) 
-0.1071 
(<.0001) 
LnBM -0.0405 
(<.0001) 
-0.0356 
(<.0001) 
-0.0399 
(<.0001) 
Accrual 0.0138 
(0.5831) 
-0.0067 
(0.7967) 
-0.0004 
(0.9901) 
LnSale -0.0252 
(0.0049) 
-0.0254 
(0.0040) 
-0.0236 
(0.0135) 
EBITMrgn -0.0608 
(0.4287) 
-0.1626 
(0.0424) 
-0.1035 
(0.2008) 
HiTech 0.0027 
(0.8616) 
0.0191 
(0.2012) 
0.0261 
(0.1168) 
Venture 0.0247 
(0.1096) 
0.0164 
(0.2893) 
0.0317 
(0.0542) 
GShoe 0.1263 
(<.0001) 
0.1226 
(<.0001) 
0.1046  
(<.0001) 
LnSize 0.0555 
(<.0001) 
0.0636 
(<.0001) 
0.0514  
(<.0001) 
 
 Table 5 continued 
Variable Intrinsic Value 
Based on Price to 
Sales Ratio 
Intrinsic Value 
Based on Price to 
EBITDA Ratio 
Intrinsic Value 
Based on Price to 
Earnings Ratio 
PSTEarnings 0.0412 
(0.0742) 
0.0323 
(0.1566) 
 
UWRank -0.0160 
 (0.0013) 
-0.0162 
(0.0008) 
-0.0205 
(0.0003) 
IA-index -0.0133 
(0.6219) 
-0.0305 
(0.2368) 
0.0107 
(0.7522) 
AvgSent -0.0104 
(0.3672) 
-0.0066 
(0.5571) 
-0.0046 
(0.7097) 
CumΔSent 0.0209 
(<.0001) 
0.0210 
(<.0001) 
0.0295 
(<.0001) 
AvgSent*IA 0.0076 
(0.5212) 
0.0069 
(0.5517) 
0.0150 
(0.2299) 
CumΔSent*IA -0.0024 
 (0.5835) 
-0.0061 
(0.1774) 
0.0062 
(0.2308) 
UWRank*IA 0.0013 
(0.6939) 
0.0044 
(0.1736) 
-0.0021 
(0.6117) 
Adj – R2 0.2399 0.2421 0.3033 
N 1046 1035 767 
  
  
